All BC deaths are very sad and have effects on the victims loved ones that we will probably never know. I have lost many friends in skiing, kayaking, and other "extreme sports" accidents over the years and I miss those people. It is very easy to make judgments about what should have been done differently by the persons involved. I have been involved in skiing and BC skiing for a very long time, as a novice, an experienced BC user, a patroller, and an avalanche educator. I'm in a place now where my views are a lot more nuanced than they once were. I also recognize that my BC skills aren't as sharp as they once were because I have chosen a path that keeps me inbounds most of the time these days.
It is a fact that the victims in this incident weren't prepared to go into the BC. They didn't have the gear and the fact that they didn't have the gear strongly suggests that they also lacked the experience and training to understand the risks they were taking by going out there. It is also a fact that they had the right to go out through the gate, just the same as everybody else. There have been a lot of ideas thrown around in this thread, some good and others that show a lack of understanding of the issues regarding the management of the BC.
The signage at the gate is more than adequate for its purpose. The gate swings in towards the resort and you must physically stop pull it towards you and step through. There is a beacon check point where you can test your beacon before you go out. There is even a very good beacon practice area available to everyone in plain sight right at the bottom of Rendezvous Bowl. There are no signs once you leave the area or marked hazards nor should there be. Part of the problem is that you can look past the boundary and see tracks almost everywhere and those tracks look pretty good. The terrain for the most part doesn't look a whole lot different from what gets skied inbounds. It is easy to make the rationalization that going where those tracks are is a normal and safe thing to do. What most people don't realize is that the normal inbounds terrain at JHMR would be incredibly dangerous without constant avalanche mitigation work by the patrol.
The idea that the BC should be closed on high risk days seems like a good one on the surface, it's not. I had an avalanche mentor who ran a Heli operation in AK. He told me a story about shutting his operation down on one particular high risk occasion. He immediately got calls from all the other operators asking him not to do that. I didn't get why the others were so upset until he explained to me that closing rather than just choosing not to fly sets a precedent that will get used against you in court. If a resource is closed one day for hazard and an incident occurs on another day, a lawyer will be able to argue that the "precedent" wasn't applied correctly and you have just assumed responsibility. I was at a party after the last incident in this same area and a local guy was loudly making the case that the gates should have been closed that day. I took a lot of shit from him for arguing the opposite. One of the other people in the group was the forest service person who had the power to make the closures. She was very interested in the idea that once a precedent had been set that the responsibility would rest on the forest service. It's the same thing with signage in the OB. If one area gets marked and another isn't, the resort just became negligent for the unmarked but equally hazardous area. My understanding of the "official" position of the JHMR regarding the OB is that the gates are open, but the resort neither encourages nor discourages its guests from passing through them. As soon as the resort starts managing closures, marking hazards, and making recommendations, they have assumed some responsibility for what happens outside their operating area.
I have more, but I'm out of time right now.